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Abstract
This paper studies the strategic effect of a difference in timing of
verification in an agency model. A principal may choose between two
equally efficient verification procedures: monitoring and auditing. Un-
der auditing the principal receives additional information. Due to a
double moral hazard problem, there exists a tension between incen-
tives for effort and incentives for verification. Auditing exacerbates
this tension and, consequently, requires steeper incentive schemes than
monitoring. Hence, auditing is suboptimal if 1) steep incentives struc-
tures are costly to implement due to bounded transfers, or 2) steep
incentive schemes induce higher rents due to limited liability.
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21 Introduction
One of the main internal problems of an organization is the existence of
moral hazard. When an employee’s effort or action cannot be observed, his
remuneration cannot be linked to his actual decision, and room for moral
hazard exists. As is well known, problems of moral hazard place a cost
on the organization. Organizations will therefore have reasons to reduce
the scope for moral hazard and obtain more accurate information through
costly verification procedures (e.g. Townsend 1979). Many aspects of these
procedures will lie in the hands of the organization itself. It must decide
what kind of information it wants to acquire, when to acquire it, and how to
use it. The purpose of this paper is to look into the ”when” of information
acquisition, its timing.1
More specifically, in a standard agency setting this paper studies two al-
ternative procedures of verification that I call monitoring and auditing. The
difference between the two procedures is that monitoring takes place while
the agent chooses his action whereas auditing occurs after he has taken his
action. This difference in timing has a strategic consequence because after
the agent’s decision the principal receives supplementary information about
the agent’s actual behavior. Hence, with auditing the principal’s decision to
verify is taken on the basis of additional information that is not available un-
der monitoring. It is this informational wedge that influences the principal’s
optimal verification procedure.
To focus on the effects that are due to this difference in timing I assume
that monitoring and auditing concern the verification of identical variables
and that both procedures are equally efficient.2 This modelling allows for
two different interpretations. First, the difference between monitoring and
1The original work on moral hazard of Holmstro¨m (1979) and Shavell (1979) considered
the question of how to use available information. Maskin and Riley (1985) and Khalil and
Lawarre´e (1995) address the first question of what kind of information the principal should
gather.
2Moreover, I abstract from all other possible differences between auditing and moni-
toring, such as that under monitoring the agent may observe the outcome of verification
and adjust his behavior accordingly, while under ex post auditing he cannot.
3auditing may regard the exact point in time at which the decision to evaluate
evidence is taken. For instance, the principal may decide to observe the agent
with video cameras. Monitoring would then mean that the principal follows
the agent’s behavior “live” on a video screen. Auditing, on the other hand,
would mean that the principal collects the recordings and decides about
reviewing them on the basis of some additional information (e.g., the success
of the project the agent worked on) that comes available after the agent has
completed his tasks. Second, the physical character of different procedures
of verification may lead to a natural difference in timing. For instance, direct
supervision of an agent necessarily implies monitoring whereas checking the
agent’s reports about his actions involves auditing.
Clearly, if the principal can fully commit herself to a specific verifica-
tion strategy ex ante, she can never be worse off under auditing. With
auditing she can achieve any outcome under monitoring by simply mimick-
ing the monitoring strategy (i.e., disregarding all intermediate information).
The mimicking-strategy, however, requires that the principal’s verification
strategy is verifiable such that her commitment to disregard additional infor-
mation is credible. When such contractual commitment is not feasible, the
weak optimality result of auditing may be overturned.
Indeed, if the principal cannot commit to a verification strategy, the prin-
cipal’s verification behavior becomes a strategic variable that is chosen se-
quentially rationally. A non-commitment to verification seems reasonable if
the effectiveness of verification depends on an unobservable scrutinizing effort
by the principal. A second reason may be due to the difficulty of committing
to random verification. As is well known (e.g. Mookherjee and Png 1989),
optimal verification procedures often require a random use of verification,
yet agents and outside courts may find it hard to verify whether the prin-
cipal did indeed apply the correct random behavior as stipulated by some
contract.3 This seems the most realistic reason why the assumption of non-
verifiable verification makes sense: many real life contracts do stipulate the
possibility that the agent is being verified, but do not determine the actual
3This argument is also used in Khalil (1997) and is further investigated in Strausz
(2001).
4frequency.4 Such contracts conform to the contractibility assumption in this
paper: the principal binds herself contractually to a verification procedure,
but its actual use is left at the principal’s discretion.
The resulting non-trivial trade-off between monitoring and auditing is
caused by a natural tension between incentives for working and incentives for
verification. To induce high effort from an agent the principal must reward
him when there is evidence that he worked. Such a payment structure implies
that the principal has a relative strong incentive to audit when she receives
bad news about the agent’s behavior. In contrast, when she has an indication
that the agent actually did work, the principal is less inclined to verify.
This difference indicates that under auditing, the principal effectively chooses
between two types of contracts: contracts that induce her to audit only after
bad information and contracts that induce her to audit also after good news.
I show that both types of contracts require relatively steep incentives. First,
if the principal audits only after observing bad news, the auditing intensity is
relatively low. As a consequence, the difference in the agent’s payment after
a positive verification and after non-verification must be large to induce the
agent to work. In contrast, if the principal is to audit also after good news,
the contract must give her an incentive to audit despite her information that
it is relatively unlikely to catch the agent doing something wrong. Hence,
the difference in the agent’s payment after a negative verification and a non-
verification must be large. Thus, both types of auditing contracts imply
a steep incentive structure. An exclusive auditing after bad news requires
steep incentives because of the agent’s moral hazard problem, and an auditing
after good news requires steep incentives due to the principal’s moral hazard
problem.
High powered incentive structures may render auditing suboptimal for
two reasons. First, if transfers are bounded or the agent is risk averse, steeper
incentive structures place a social cost on the organization and monitoring
becomes preferable. Second, when the agent’s liability is limited, his rent is
increasing in the steepness of the incentive scheme. Auditing therefore leads
4In many countries employers are, by law, only allowed to use (stochastic) verification
procedures if they inform their employees explicitly about their existence ex ante.
5to higher rents for the agent. Hence, if the increase in rents is large, auditing
is suboptimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
a simple model of verification. Section 3 derives the optimal contract under
monitoring, and Section 4 analyzes the case of auditing. Section 5 compares
the optimal contracts and derives conditions under which monitoring is su-
perior to auditing. Some extensions are investigated in Section 6. Section 7
concludes. All proofs of the propositions are available on the JEBO website
at [INSERT WEBADDRESS].
2 The Model
Consider a risk neutral principal who has a project that is run by a risk
neutral agent. The agent chooses to work w or shirk s. If the agent works,
the project is always successful. With shirking the project is only successful
with probability p. A successful project yields the principal a payoff of y.
An unsuccessful project is worthless. Hence, the productive gain when the
agent works is ∆y ≡ (1− p)y. If the agent works he incurs a disutility of e.
Shirking is costless to the agent. The difference ∆y − e measures therefore
the potential social gain of working versus shirking. To have a non-trivial
problem, I assume that this gain is strictly positive, ∆y > e.
The agent’s decision and the success of the project are not verifiable.
Instead, the principal may, at a personal cost c < e, verify the agent’s action
to detect shirking. That is, there exists a verifiable signal σ ∈ {w, s} about
the agent’s action whose informative content depends on a verification effort
of the principal. The principal’s effort is binary; she either verifies actively
and incurs the cost c or she does not verify. Active verification reveals a
shirking agent perfectly. If the principal does not verify actively, she cannot
detect shirking and the signal σ always reports w.
The principal and agent write a contract t that stipulates transfers from
the principal to the agent. Since only the signal σ about the action is veri-
fiable, a general contract of transfers is a combination (tw, ts). The agent’s
6liability is limited to zero. The maximum transfer that the principal can
promise is bounded by t¯ ≥ e. Hence, a feasible contract requires tw, ts ∈ [0, t¯].
Due to the simple structure, the difference ∆t ≡ tw − ts measures the steep-
ness of the agent’s incentive structure. Limited liability implies that the
steepness is at most t¯.5 Finally, the agent’s outside option is zero.
Before offering a contract to the agent the principal commits to one of the
two verification procedures auditing or monitoring. If the principal adopts
monitoring, she chooses her verification effort before knowing the agent’s
action, and the timing is as follows:
1. Principal offers a contract.
2. Agent decides whether to accept the contract.
3. Agent and principal decide simultaneously about action and verification
effort respectively.
Hence, under monitoring the agent and principal play a simultaneous
move game. In contrast, the principal and the agent play a sequential game
under auditing. The agent chooses first his action, after which the principal
observes the output. Only then she chooses whether to verify:
1. Principal offers a contract.
2. Agent decides whether to accept the contract.
3. Agent chooses his action.
4. Principal observes the output and chooses verification effort.
5The bounded transfers are intended to model a disadvantage to steep incentive struc-
tures (they make it impossible (i.e., infinitely costly) to implement incentive structures
that are steeper than t¯). Although risk aversion would be a more natural way to introduce
such a disadvantage, the use of bounded transfers enables us to differ between two effects
that may render auditing suboptimal. Moreover, risk aversion renders the analysis less
tractable and makes it more difficult to separate the two effects that determine the optimal
verification procedure.
7The game with auditing is more complicated in that the principal takes
her decision under asymmetric information. Hence, whereas with monitoring
we may solve the subgame in stage 3 as a straightforward Nash equilibrium,
the appropriate equilibrium concept in the game with auditing is Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium.
3 Monitoring
First suppose the principal uses monitoring as her procedure of verification.
Clearly, if the principal does not monitor actively, the agent will shirk, since
without verification his remuneration is independent of his actual action.
Hence, if the principal wants to induce the agent to work, she must verify
actively. Indeed, if the principal monitors with probability γ the agent re-
ceives a net utility of γtw + (1− γ)tw − e if he works. Shirking, on the other
hand, yields the agent γts+(1−γ)tw. Hence, the agent has a weak incentive
to work if
∆t ≥ e/γ. (1)
The inequality represents the agent’s incentive constraint. It shows that the
required steepness of the incentive structure, ∆t, is inversely related to the
principal’s monitoring intensity γ. Indeed, if γ approaches zero, the required
wedge ∆t goes to infinity. It reflects the observation that at least some active
verification has to occur to induce the agent to work.
Inducing the agent to work requires active verification by the principal,
yet because verification is not contractible, the contract (tw, ts) must give
the principal genuine incentives to monitor. Given that the agent works, the
principal pays tw+c if she decides to monitor. If she, on the other hand, does
not verify, she pays tw. Hence, given that the agent worked, the principal
will not monitor. Consequently, there is no equilibrium in which the agent
works with probability one.
Now suppose the agent chooses to work with a probability α less than
one. This requires that the agent must be indifferent between working and
8shirking. That is, the agent’s incentive constraint (1) holds in equality:
∆t = e/γ. (2)
If the principal monitors, she expects to pay αtw + (1 − α)ts + c, whereas
she pays tw if she does not monitor. Hence, the principal has an incentive to
monitor if
∆t ≥ c
1− α. (3)
Inequality (3) represents the principal’s incentive constraint to monitor ac-
tively. It confirms the former observation that the principal cannot be given
incentives to monitor if the agent works with probability one, as the required
wedge ∆t goes to infinity when α goes to one.
The incentive constraints (2) and (3) describe the implementation re-
strictions due to the double moral hazard problem. In addition to these
constraints, the contract must ensure the participation of the agent by yield-
ing the agent a non-negative utility. Yet, because the agent is protected by a
limited liability of zero and shirking is costless, any admissible contract yields
the agent a non-negative payoff if he chooses to shirk. Hence, any incentive
compatible contract that satisfies limited liability ensures the agent at least
his reservation utility. It follows that one may disregard the agent’s individ-
ual rationality constraint and that the optimal contract solves the following
problem:
Pm : max
tw,ts,γ,α
Vm = (α+ (1− α)p)y − αtw − (1− α)[γts + (1− γ)tw]− γc
s.t. (1− γ)(∆t− c/(1− α)) = 0 (4)
(2) and (3),
where the constraint (4) guarantees that the principal is indifferent about
monitoring if she monitors with a probability less than one.
Proposition 1 Under monitoring the optimal contract is (tw, ts) = (t
∗
w, 0)
and yields the principal V ∗m. It induces the agent to work with probability
9α = 1− c/t∗w and the principal to monitor with probability γ = e/t∗w, where
t∗w =


e if c∆y < e2√
c∆y if c∆y ∈ [e2, t¯2]
t¯ if c∆y > t¯2
V ∗m =


y − e− c∆y/e if c∆y < e2
y − 2√c∆y if c∆y ∈ [e2, t¯2]
y − t¯− c∆y/t¯ if c∆y > t¯2.
The proposition shows that the maximum punishment principle holds
so that ts is set to its minimum of zero.
6 The optimal level of tw depends
on the cost of verification c. If monitoring costs are relatively small, the
principal chooses tw such that she monitors with probability 1. For larger
monitoring costs it is optimal for the principal to monitor with a probability
less than one. Since t∗w is increasing in c, we obtain the intuitive result that
the monitoring intensity is decreasing in the cost of verification c. Finally,
the maximum allowable transfer t¯ restricts the principal only if it is relatively
small.
4 Auditing
Now suppose the principal chooses auditing as her procedure of verification.
In this case the principal decides about active verification after observing the
project’s outcome. Hence, she may audit failed and successful projects with
different intensities. Suppose the principal audits successful projects with
probability γσ and failures with probability γf . To induce the agent to work
with positive probability, the decision to work must yield the agent at least
as much as shirking. Given the principal’s auditing intensities γf and γσ, the
agent receives a utility of p(γσts + (1 − γσ)tw) + (1 − p)(γf ts + (1 − γf )tw)
when he shirks. Working, on the other hand, yields a net utility of tw − e.
Hence, the agent has a weak incentive to work if
∆t ≥ e
γσp+ γf (1− p) . (5)
6Proofs of the propositions are available on the JEBO website at [INSERT WEBAD-
DRESS].
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Constraint (5) represents the agent’s incentive constraint under auditing. It
shows that at least some auditing must take place if the agent is to work
with positive probability.
The principal’s auditing behavior is guided by the contract t and her
belief about the agent’s behavior. More precisely, given that the principal
believes that the agent worked with probability ω, she has a weak incentive
to audit if
ωtw + (1− ω)ts + c ≤ tw.
The principal’s belief ω depends on the outcome of the project. If the prin-
cipal observes a failure, this can only have come because the agent shirked.
Hence, ωf = 0 and the principal has a (weak) incentive to audit a failed
project if
∆t ≥ c. (6)
On the other hand, if the principal observes a successful project, the agent
either worked or shirked but was lucky. Given that the agent works with
probability α the probability that the agent worked follows from Bayes’ rule:
ωσ =
α
α+ (1− α)p.
Consequently, the principal has a (weak) incentive to audit after observing
a successful project if
∆t ≥ c
(
1 +
α
(1− α)p
)
. (7)
Effectively, constraints (6) and (7) imply that the principal may choose
between two basic auditing strategies. Either she audits only after observing
a failure, or she audits also after observing a success. Quite intuitively,
the principal cannot induce herself to audit only successful projects because
constraint (7) is stricter than (6). That is, the auditing intensities γf and
γσ are interdependent. If the principal audits successful projects with a
positive probability, then she must audit failed projects with probability
11
one. Alternatively, if the principal audits failed projects with a probability
less than one, she does not audit successful projects.
One may use the interdependence to simplify the agent’s incentive con-
straint (5). If the principal audits failures with a probability less than one
(γf < 1), she does not audit successes (γσ = 0), and the agent’s incentive
constraint (5) reduces to
∆t ≥ e
γf (1− p) . (8)
In contrast, if the principal audits successful projects with a probability
γσ > 0, the principal audits failed project with certainty, γf = 1. Moreover,
it requires that inequality (7) must be strictly satisfied such that α < 1. That
is, if in equilibrium the principal audits also successful projects, the agent has
to shirk with positive probability and must, therefore, be indifferent between
working and shirking. Consequently, the incentive constraint (5) rewrites as
∆t =
e
1− (1− γσ)p. (9)
Whether the principal chooses a contract that induces her to audit only
failures or also successes depends on which type of contract yields the highest
utility. The optimal contract when the principal audits both successful and
failed projects solves the following problem:7
P b : max
tw,ts,γσ ,α
Vb = (α+ (1− α)p)y − α(tw + γσc)
−(1− α)[p((1− γσ)tw + γσts + γσc)− (1− p)(ts + c)]
s.t. (1− γσ)c[1 + α/((1− α)p)] = 0 (10)
(7) and (9),
where equality (10) guarantees that the principal is indifferent about auditing
a successful project if she is to audit such projects with a probability less than
one.
7Again any incentive compatible contract satisfying limited liability is automatically
individual rational to the agent.
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In order to derive the solution to the problem P b define
tˆb ≡
√
(1− p)c(c+ py)− (1− p)c
p
.
Proposition 2 The optimal contract that induces the principal to audit both
failed and successful projects is (tw, ts) = (t
∗
b , 0), where
t∗b =

 min{tˆb, e/(1− p), t¯} if tˆb ≥ ee if tˆb < e.
It yields the principal the payoff V ∗b , where
V ∗b =


t¯p(y−t¯)−c2(1−p)
(1−p)c+t¯p
if tˆb > t¯ and t¯ < e/(1− p)
ep(y(1−p)−e)−c2(1−p)3
(1−p)2c+ep
if tˆb > e/(1− p) and t¯ ≥ e/(1− p)
y − 2(1−p)c−2
√
(1−p)c(c+py)
p
if tˆb ∈ [e, t¯]
ep(y−e)−c2(1−p)
(1−p)c+ep
if tˆb < e.
In the associated equilibrium the agent works with probability α = [t∗w −
c]/[t∗w− c+ c/p]. The principal audits failed projects with probability one and
successful projects with probability γf = 1− [t∗w − e]/(t∗wp).
The proposition shows that the optimal contract that leads to auditing
both failed and successful projects induces a similar equilibrium under moni-
toring. In both equilibria the principal and agent use a mixed strategy. Also
the intuition behind the result is the same. If the agent would work with
probability one, the principal will not monitor or verify a successful project.
As an alternative to auditing both failed and successful projects, the
principal may choose a contract that induces her to audit only failures. An
optimal contract of this kind solves
P f : max
tw,ts,γf ,α
Vf = (α+ (1− α)p)(y − tw)− (1− α)(1− p)(γf ts + (1− γf )tw + cγf )
s.t. (1− γf )[∆t− c] = 0; (1− α)[∆t− e/(γf (1− p))] = 0 (11)
(6) and (8),
where the constraints in (11) guarantee that the principal or agent is indif-
ferent if she or he uses a mixed strategy.
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Proposition 3 An optimal contract that induces the principal to audit only
failed projects exists only if t¯ ≥ e/(1−p). It exhibits t∗w = e/(1−p) and t∗s = 0
and induces the principal to audit failed projects with probability one and the
agent to work with probability one. It yields the principal V ∗f = y− e/(1−p).
The nature of the optimal contract differs from the other type of contract
under auditing and monitoring. First, in equilibrium the principal’s incen-
tives are strict.8 That is, the principal’s incentive constraint is not binding.
At first sight, this is surprising as it implies that the principal’s inability to
commit does not constrain the equilibrium. The result is nevertheless intu-
itive. If the principal observes a failure, she is sure that the agent did not
work. A failure, therefore, leads to the lower payment ts. The previously
used argument that the principal will not verify if she is sure that the agent
works does therefore not hold.9 In fact, the principal uses auditing only as a
threat to withhold the agent from shirking and auditing does not take place
in equilibrium.
This type of contract has therefore two attractive features. First it en-
ables the principal to induce the agent to work with probability one without
incurring any verification costs. Second, the contract only exists if the max-
imum possible payment t¯ is large enough. This observation follows directly
from the agent’s incentive constraint (8). Indeed, given that the principal
audits failed projects exclusively, the agent’s shirking is identified only if the
project fails. Hence, the detection probability of shirking is at most 1 − p.
This reveals the disadvantage that an exclusive auditing of failures implies a
low detection probability and, therefore, requires high powered incentives for
the agent. Such high powered incentives are possible only if the maximum
allowable payment t¯ is large enough.
8This follows from c < e < e/(1− p) = ∆t.
9Technically, the agent’s decision shifts the support of the principal’s observation. If
a failure could also occur with some (small) positive probability when the agent works
then working with probability one is not sustainable in equilibrium. Since this would
make auditing less attractive, the shifting support gives auditing an extra advantage over
monitoring. It will be shown that it may nevertheless be suboptimal.
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5 Monitoring versus Auditing
The previous two sections derived the optimal contracts under monitoring
and auditing. This section compares the three different types of contracts.
Comparing the optimal contract under monitoring to the optimal contract
that gives the principal incentives to audit both failed and successful projects
yields the following result.
Proposition 4 It holds V ∗m ≥ V ∗b .
The proposition establishes the superiority of monitoring over an audit-
ing of failed and successful projects. To understand the result, note that
in both equilibria the principal verifies probabilistically. That is, she is, in
equilibrium, indifferent concerning verification. Therefore, the difference in
her payoffs in the two equilibria depends only on the contract t and is inde-
pendent of the intensity of verification. It then follows that Proposition 4 is
entirely driven by the principal’s commitment problem: for a given working
intensity α the principal believes that, if she monitors, she saves on the wage
payment tw with probability 1− α. Her consideration is different under au-
diting where the principal receives additional information before she decides
to verify. In particular observing a success raises the principal’s belief from
α to ωσ. Hence, after a success she considers it less likely to save on the
payment tw if she verifies. To induce her to verify nevertheless, the saved
amount tw must be larger. This implies a steeper incentive structure, which
leads to more risk on the agent and a higher wage bill for the principal.
Indeed, as the principal’s incentive constraints (3) and (7) capture the
principal’s inability to commit, a direct comparison of these two constraints
confirms the reasoning. The constraint (3) is weaker than (7), implying that
for a given working intensity α, auditing requires a higher powered incentive
structure than monitoring.
Because for t¯ < e/(1−p) a contract that induces the agent to work requires
the principal to audit both failed and successful projects, the proposition has
a straightforward corollary.
Corollary 1 Monitoring is strictly better than auditing if t¯ < e/(1− p).
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Hence, if the maximum payment t¯ is relatively low, such that the principal
is unable to induce the agent to work by auditing only failures, the principal
prefers monitoring over auditing. The result follows from the exogenously
bounded transfers, but is ultimately due to the need for high powered incen-
tives. That is, auditing can only be better than monitoring if the implemen-
tation of steep incentives is not too costly. Since a steeper incentive structure
implies more risk, steep incentives are costly to implement if the agent is risk
averse. That is, if transfers are unlimited but the agent is risk averse, then
auditing is inferior to monitoring because the cost of compensating the agent
for his increased risk will outweigh the gain from a selective auditing of failed
projects. Indeed, one may see a boundedness of transfers as an extreme form
of risk aversion. Instead of restricting wages to the interval [0, t¯], one may
assume that the agent has a utility of u(t) = min{t, t¯} for positive transfers
t ≥ 0. That is, the agent is risk neutral in the interval [0, t¯] and infinitely
risk averse for wages lower than 0 and exceeding t¯.
The corollary shows that one factor that influences the optimal verifica-
tion procedure is the social costs associated with steep incentive schemes due
to risk aversion or limited funds. The remainder of this section shows that
even if steep incentive schemes do not involve a social cost, auditing may still
be suboptimal due to the principal’s concern over rents.
As discussed earlier the advantage of auditing is that the principal may
circumvent her commitment problem and induce the agent to work with prob-
ability one without incurring verification costs. However, under an exclusive
auditing of failed projects, the verification intensity is at most 1 − p and
implies that the agent’s incentive structure must be rather steep to induce
him to work. As the agent is protected by limited liability, a steep incentive
scheme results in a large rent to the agent. Hence, apart from the increased
risk a second drawback of the auditing strategy is that it may require a rel-
atively large rent to the agent. As an alternative namely the principal may
use monitoring. In this case, the principal is able to verify with a larger
probability, which translates into a smaller rent to the agent. A drawback,
however, is that the principal is unable to induce the agent to work with
probability one and, in addition, incurs positive verification costs, yet when
16
1
p
c
Monitoring with
probability 1
Monitoring with a
probability less than 1
Auditing of failed projects only
e2/∆y
Figure 1: Optimal verification procedures due to rent extraction.
the principal has to give up too many rents under auditing, monitoring will
be optimal.10
The following proposition identifies the optimal verification strategy due
to the problem of rent extraction.
Proposition 5 Suppose the maximum transfer is unbounded; then monitor-
ing is strictly optimal if and only if
c∆y < S(p, e)
with
S(p, e) =


e2p
(1−p)
for p ≤ 1/2
e2
4(1−p)2
for p > 1/2.
The result shows that when c and ∆y are relatively large in comparison
to e/(1− p), auditing is optimal. Indeed, if the cost of verification c and ∆y
are high, the advantage of auditing is large because it saves on verification
costs and allows a working intensity of one. On the other hand e/(1 − p)
10Note that without a social cost to steep incentive schemes, this implies that the prin-
cipal does not maximize the overall surplus and takes a socially inefficient decision. See
Strausz (2005) for a more careful analysis of this effect.
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represents the agent’s rent under auditing and renders auditing suboptimal
if it is too large.
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition graphically. When the verification
procedure is accurate (high p), verification is relatively effective in extracting
the agent’s rent. Hence, the fact that auditing requires higher rents plays only
a minor role. Consequently, auditing is optimal. For less accurate signals, the
rent argument gains in relative importance, and monitoring becomes optimal.
In this case, the principal always monitors when the cost of monitoring is
low. When costs increase, the principal decreases the monitoring frequency,
which implies that she uses it randomly.
6 An Extension: Verifiable Output
Until now we used an extremely stylized model that allowed us to calculate
explicitly the optimal contracts under monitoring and auditing and compare
them accordingly. The analysis becomes less tractable if one considers more
standard contracting settings, in which the agent’s contract conditions on
additional verifiable variables such as output. In this section we confirm,
however, that the tension between incentives for working and verification also
exists in these more elaborate models. Again, assume that the agent chooses
between two effort levels eh and el with costs e > 0 and zero, respectively. As
is more standard, let effort result in a distribution f(y|ei) over the possible
output levels Y ⊂ IR. As before, the principal chooses between two intensities
of verification v1 and v0, where the higher intensity v1 has a cost of c > 0
and the lower intensity has costs zero. Verification at intensity level vj leads
to a verifiable result a ∈ A according to the distribution function gj(a|ei).
Verification at the intensity level v0 is uninformative. That is, g0(a|eh) =
g0(a|el) for all a ∈ A. In contrast, the verifiable result a is informative if the
principal verifies with the higher intensity level v1. This means that there
exists some subset A1 ⊂ A with positive measure such that g1(a|eh) 6= g1(a|el)
for all a ∈ A1.
Let output y ∈ Y be verifiable such that transfers between the principal
and agent may now depend directly on y and a. We write t(y, a). Feasibility
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requires t(y, a) ∈ [0, t¯]. Given some contract t(y, a) we may define
tij ≡
∫ ∫
t(y, a)f(y|ei)gj(a|ei)dyda (12)
as the expected payment to the agent if the agent chooses effort level ei and
the principal verifies with intensity level vj.
11
If the principal chooses the verification intensity v1 with probability γ,
the agent receives γth1 + (1− γ)th0 − e when he works and γtl1 + (1− γ)tl0
when he shirks. The agent’s incentive constraint is therefore
γ∆t ≥ e+ tl0 − th0, (13)
with
∆t ≡ th1 − tl1 − th0 + tl0.
If the right hand side of (13) is negative, the contract is able to induce the
agent to work while verifying at the low intensity v0. However, depending
on the difference f(y|eh)− f(y|el) this may require transfers t(y, a) that are
not feasible or imply large rents. Hence, suppose that th0 − tl0 < e so that
the principal must verify with the higher intensity v1 in order to induce the
agent to work. In this case, the agent’s incentive constraint (13) implies that
∆t must be positive.
If the principal believes the agent to work with probability αe, she expects
to pay αeth1 + (1− αe)tl1 + c when she verifies and αeth0 + (1− αe)tl0 when
she does not verify. Consequently, she verifies if
αe∆t ≤ tl0 − tl1 − c. (14)
As before, the incentive constraints (13) and (14) reveal a tension between
incentives for working and incentives for verification. On the one hand, ∆t
must be large enough to induce the agent to work. On the other hand, ∆t
must be small enough to induce the principal to verify. In particular, the
larger αe the stronger the tension between the two constraints. This relation
11In the more stylized model we had th0 = tl0 = th1 = tw and tl1 = ts.
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drives the result that under auditing it is more difficult to induce an intensive
verification of the agent. To see this, note that under monitoring the princi-
pal’s belief αe coincides in equilibrium with the agent’s actual randomization
α∗.
Under auditing the principal’s belief depends on some additional infor-
mation s. To make this more precise, let h(sj|ei) ∈ [0, 1] represent the prob-
ability that the principal receives the signal sj ∈ S = {s1, . . . , sN} when the
agent chooses action ei. Suppose the set S is ordered such that a higher sig-
nal indicates that the agent worked, h(sj|eh)/h(sj|el) > h(sj−1|eh)/h(sj−1|el).
Now, if the agent randomizes with probability α∗ then, in equilibrium, the
principal’s belief after receiving the signal si satisfies
αe(si) =
α∗h(si|eh)
α∗h(si|eh) + (1− α∗)h(si|el) .
Due to the ordering of the signal s, the belief αe(si) is increasing in i.
It now follows that it is harder for the principal to verify with a high prob-
ability under auditing than under monitoring. For instance, if the principal
wants to audit with probability one, she must have an incentive to audit for
any si and in particular for sN , but since, necessarily, h(sN |eh) > h(sN |el),
it holds αe(sN) > α
∗ so that the principal’s incentive constraint is stricter
under auditing than under monitoring. This implies that with monitoring
the principal is able to verify more easily with a high frequency than under
auditing. Consequently, the optimal frequency under auditing tends to be
lower than under monitoring, but if the agent is less frequently verified under
auditing, steeper incentives are requires to induce the agent to take a high
effort level. We therefore obtain the same results as in the simpler model in
which output was not contractible.
7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studied the strategic effect of a difference in the timing of ver-
ification. It showed that when the principal’s verification behavior is non-
contractible, monitoring may be optimal. The non-contractibility creates a
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double moral hazard problem and, thereby, requires steeper incentive struc-
tures under auditing. The agent’s moral hazard problem asks for steeper
incentives if the verification intensity is low. The principal’s moral hazard
problem demands a steeper incentive structure if the principal is to use a
high verification intensity. For two reasons steeper incentive schemes may
render auditing suboptimal. First, they may be too costly to implement due
to reasons of risk aversion or limited funds. Second, the incentive structure
affects the division of rents to create an additional trade-off. At the expense
of a higher rent to the agent, auditing enables a higher working intensity at
lower verification costs. Depending on the outcome of this trade-off either
monitoring or auditing is optimal. Ultimately, the optimality of monitoring
is due to a natural tension between the principal’s incentives to verify and
the incentives for the agent which is stronger under auditing. Indeed, by
switching to monitoring as her procedure of verification the principal relaxes
the tension. Hence, monitoring may be seen as a commitment device not to
act on the additional information.
Although the paper used a simple model the main result that auditing
(i.e., additional information) requires steeper incentives is robust. As shown
in the previous section an extension to multiple output levels and different
sources of information do not affect qualitative results. Crucial and driving
the result is the double moral hazard problem. Additional information about
the agent’s action intensifies the tension between the two problems and re-
quires higher stakes and steeper incentives. If such incentive structures are
costly to implement, preventing oneself from receiving additional information
(i.e., choosing monitoring rather than auditing) may be an optimal strategy.
The limited liability on the part of the agent is responsible for the positive
rent to the agent. Hence, without limited liability the second disadvantage
of auditing, that steeper incentives require higher rents, disappears. In this
case, auditing also imposes more risk on the agent than monitoring and may
therefore be suboptimal due to risk aversion.
Since the difference between monitoring and auditing is only the addi-
tional information, our results also shed light on the value of information to
the principal. More precisely, only if steep incentives are not too costly to
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implement can the information have a positive value to the principal. In this
case, the difference V ∗f −V ∗m expresses the value of information and represents
the principal’s maximum willingness to pay for the information.
As discussed in the introduction it is trivial that auditing is (weakly) su-
perior if the principal can commit to a verification strategy. Starting from a
moral hazard problem, this paper therefore studied non–contractible verifi-
cation. This transforms the model in a double moral hazard problem, which
is more severe under auditing. Subsequently, conditions were studied under
which monitoring is optimal. It remains an open question as to how far the
results and the provided intuition of this model extend for a setting in which
the principal’s basic problem is an adverse selection rather than a moral
hazard problem. As is well known, the analysis of an adverse selection prob-
lem with limited commitment is rather involved (for a possible approach see
Bester and Strausz 2001) and fundamentally different from a moral hazard
problem. Nevertheless, also in this class of models, the principal is often hurt
by more information so that one may expect to find conditions under which
auditing may be suboptimal as well. How far these conditions relate to the
ones arrived under moral hazard remains a question for future research.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof: We solve problem Pm by first disregarding (4) since the solution of
the relaxed problem automatically satisfies the constraint. Substitution of
(2) yields the simplified problem
max
ts,γ,α
V = (α+ (1− α)p)y − ts − (1− (1− α)γ)e/γ − γc
s.t. α ≤ 1− cγ/e (15)
with tw = ts+e/γ. Since (15) is independent of ts and the objective constraint
is decreasing in ts, optimality requires ts = 0. Moreover, assuming that (15)
is not binding leads to a contradiction: if it does not bind, the objective
function is linear in α and, since, by assumption, α > 0 is optimal, linearity
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implies that α = 1 is optimal, yet this violates the constraint. That is, (15)
is binding so that (4) is indeed satisfied. By substitution of (2) and (4) and
using ts = 0, the original maximization problem P
m may be rewritten as
max
tw
y − tw − c∆y
tw
,
which is concave in tw as the 2nd derivative with respect to tw is −2c∆y/t3w.
Hence, the first order condition is sufficient and yields
tˆw =
√
c∆y.
If tˆw > t¯, then optimally t
∗
w = t¯. Otherwise, t
∗
w = max{e, tˆw}, where tˆw ≥ e
if and only if c∆y ≥ e2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof: Substituting out tw by using (9) yields
Vb = (α+(1−α)p)y−c(1−(1−α)(1−γσ)p−α(1−γσ))−(α+ (1− γσ)(1− α)p)e
1− (1− γσ)p −ts,
and shows that Vb is decreasing in ts (a lower ts also relaxes the remaining
constraint (7)). Hence, optimality requires ts = 0. Moreover, since Vb is
linear in α and, by assumption, α > 0 is optimal, it follows that (7) must
bind at the optimum. This implies that (10) is automatically satisfied. By
using (7) and (9) to substitute out α and γs the problem P
b reduces to
max
tw∈[e,min{e/(1−p),t¯}]
Vb(tw) ≡ ptw(y − tw)− c
2(1− p)
ptw + (1− p)c , (16)
where the domain restriction tw ∈ [e, e/(1 − p)] guarantees that γ ∈ [0, 1].
The first order condition is
tˆb =
√
(1− p)c(c+ py)− (1− p)c
p
.
It leads to a utility of
Vˆ ∗b ≡ y −
2
√
(1− p)c(c+ py)− 2(1− p)c
p
. (17)
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Since the 2nd derivative with respect to tw at tˆ2w is−2p/
√
(1− p)c(c+ py) <
0 the first order condition is sufficient if it satisfies the domain restrictions,
that is, t∗w = tˆb is optimal if tˆb ∈ [e,min{e/(1 − p), t¯}]. Now if tˆb < e then
t∗w = e is optimal. On the other hand, if tˆb > min{e/(1 − p), t¯}, then opti-
mality requires t∗w = min{e/(1− p), t¯}. For the principal’s utility it follows
V ∗b =


t¯p(y−t¯)−c2(1−p)
(1−p)c+t¯p
if tˆb > t¯ and t¯ < e/(1− p)
ep(y(1−p)−e)−c2(1−p)3
(1−p)[(1−p)2c+ep]
if tˆb > e/(1− p) and t¯ ≥ e/(1− p)
Vˆ ∗b if tˆb ∈ [e,min{e/(1− p), t¯}]
ep(y−e)−c2(1−p)
(1−p)c+ep
if tˆb < e.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof: From (8), γf ≤ 1 and ts ≥ 0, it follows that tw ≥ e/(1− p), but since
tw ≤ t¯, a necessary condition for the existence of a contract that induces the
agent to work is t¯ ≥ e/(1− p).
If t¯ ≥ e/(1 − p) then constraint (11) implies that either α = 1 or (8)
is binding. First suppose (8) is slack such that α = 1. The maximization
problem reduces then to
max
tw,ts,γf
y − tw
s.t. (1− γf )(∆t− c) = 0;∆t ≤ c
and yields tw = c, ts = 0 as an optimum. Since c < e, this violates (8) for
any γf ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, (8) must be binding at the optimum, which
implies that (11) is automatically satisfied. Disregarding (11) implies that
α only enters linearly in the objective function Vf . Hence, α = 1 must be
optimal, while (8) is binding. This reduces the maximization problem to
max
γf∈[0,1],ts≥0
y − ts − e/((1− p)γf )
s.t. (1− γf )[e/(γf (1− p))− c] = 0 (18)
e/(γf (1− p)) ≥ c.
It follows that γf = 1 and ts = 0 is optimal such that t
∗
w = e/(1 − p) and
V ∗f = y − e/(1− p); apart from necessary, the condition t¯ ≥ e/(1− p) is also
sufficient for existence.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof: We must show that V ∗m ≥ V ∗b . Since t¯ > e it suffices to distinguish
between three cases:
1) If c∆y ∈ [e2, t¯2] then, according to Proposition 1, V ∗m = y − 2
√
c∆y.
From the proof of Proposition 2 it follows V ∗b ≤ Vˆ ∗2 . We now show that
V ∗m − Vˆ ∗b =
2
[√
(1− p)c(c+ py)− (1− p)c− p
√
(1− p)cy
]
p
(19)
is non-negative because the term in the square bracket is non-negative. This
follows from
p2(c− (1− p)y)2 ≥ 0⇒ (c+ py + (1− p)c− p2y)2 ≥ 4(1− p)c(c+ py)
⇒ c+ py + (1− p)c− p2y ≥ 2
√
(1− p)c(c+ py)
⇒ c+ py + (1− p)c− 2
√
(1− p)c(c+ py) ≥ p2y
⇒ (1− p)c
[
(c+ py) + (1− p)c− 2
√
(1− p)c(c+ py)
]
≥ (1− p)cp2y
⇒
√
(1− p)c(c+ py)− (1− p)c ≥ p
√
(1− p)cy;
2) for c∆y < e2 it holds V ∗m = y − e − c∆y/e and V ∗b ∈ {Vb(tw)|tw ∈
[e, e/(1− p)]} with Vb(tw) as defined by (16), but for any tw ∈ [e, e/(1− p)]
it holds
V ∗m − Vb(tw) =
p
≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(tw − e)
≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[etw − c∆y] +c(1− p)
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(e− c)
≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
[∆y − e]
(1− p)ce+ ptwe︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≥ 0,
where the non-negativity of the first bracketed term follows from c∆y < e2 <
etw;
3) if c∆y > t¯2 then V ∗m = y − t¯ − c∆y/t¯. Due to c < e < ∆y it holds
tˆb >
√
c∆y > t¯. Therefore, tˆb exceeds t¯, which implies V
∗
b ≤ Vˆ ∗b = (t¯p(y −
t¯)− c2(1− p))/((1− p)c+ t¯p). It follows that
V ∗m − Vˆ ∗b =
c(1− p)(t¯− c)[∆y − t¯]
t¯(c+ p(t¯− c)) > 0.
The inequality holds because from
√
c∆y > t¯ and t¯ > c, it follows ∆y >
t¯2/c > t¯.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof: If the maximum transfer t¯ is unbounded, then V ∗f = y− e/(1−p). It
follows from Proposition 4 that auditing is superior if and only if V ∗m < V
∗
f .
For c∆y < e2 it holds V ∗m = y − 2
√
c∆y. Hence, V ∗m < V
∗
f if and only if
c∆y < e2p/(1 − p). This yields a critical threshold p1(c) = c∆y/(c∆y + e2)
for the range c < e2/∆y.
For c∆y ≥ e2 it holds V ∗m = y− e− c∆y/e. Hence, V ∗m < V ∗f if and only if
4c∆y < e2/(1− p)2. This yields a critical threshold p2(c) = 1− e/(2
√
c∆y)
for the range c ≥ e2/∆y.
Note that p1(e
2/∆y) = p2(e
2/∆y) = 1/2 so that the combined function
P (c) =

 p1(c) for c < e
2/∆y
p2(c) for c ≥ e2/∆y
is continuous in c. Moreover, P (c) is also differentiable at c = e2/∆y since
p′1(e
2/∆y) = p′2(e
2/∆y). Finally, the function S(p, e) obtains from inverting
P (c).
Q.E.D.
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